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Island,25 specifically require the city police to return data.
The acquitted person must look to the courts in the other forty-six
states. In reviewing the cases, what can be expected from the courts?
With the exception of New York, since 1905 the courts have refused to
compel city police to return data. The early Louisiana cases that compelled
the return of photographs are probably dated because the public rogues'
gallery is a thing of the past. Without the aid of a statute the acquitted
citizen must rely on his "right of privacy." Here again he meets judicial
reluctance, since only about half of the states have recognized the "right
to privacy. ' 2 And now, with the Illinois case of Kolb v. O'Connor,27 re-
fusing to compel city police to return data, where the statute only requires
return by the state bureau of criminal identification, the acquitted citizen
has small chance of obtaining his records.
25 N.Y. Gen. Laws Ann. (1944) Penal Law § 516; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 620, § 7.
26A footnote to Hazlitt v. Fawcett Publications, 116 F.Supp. 538, 542, 543 (D.C.
Conn., 1953) lists the decisions up to 1953. Consult Prosser, Torts, 635 (2d ed., 1955) for
more recent decisions.
27 13 111. App. 2d 81, 142 N.E. 2d 818 (1957).
LABOR LAW-COURTS MAY NOT INTERFERE WITH
SELECTION OF MEMBERS OF LABOR UNION
The plaintiffs, two Negroes, desiring to join a labor union, were denied
membership solely on account of the fact that they were Negroes. Plain-
tiffs based their rights to relief on three grounds, the first of which is that
the Wisconsin Constitution, the circuit court has jurisdiction to order the
union to admit the plaintiffs. Section nine, Article I, of the Wisconsin
Constitution reads:
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or
wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character....
Plaintiffs, therefore, contend that since a wrong has been committed, the
Wisconsin courts have jurisdiction to order the union to admit them to
membership. The court in turn replied that the wrongs contemplated by
this language were those resulting from an invasion of a party's legal
rights; and that since unions are voluntary associations which may select
their own members, there has been no invasion of the plaintiffs' legal
rights. Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W. 2d 315 (1957).
The case of Mayer v. Journeyman Stone-Cutters' Ass'n' originated the
proposition that courts will not interfere with the selection of membership
by a union. It was there held that unions "may restrict membership to the
147 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 AtI. 492 (1890).
CASE NOTES
original promoters, or limit the number to be thereafter admitted," and
that "this power is incident to its character as a voluntary association and
can not be inquired into." 2 The basis of the preceding holding is that if
unions were compelled to accept everyone for membership, persons whose
interests were inimical to the union could force themselves in and destroy
the organization. 3 In Miller v. Ruehl4 the court refused to compel the
union to accept the plaintiffs despite the fact that it was impossible for
plaintiffs to work in their trade unless they were members of the union.
The court stated that in the absence of legislation the court can not com-
pel the unions to admit members.5 Some courts, however, do not allow
unions to be arbitrarily restrictive in their membership when a person's
right to work depends on his being a member. In Wilson v. Newspaper
and Mail Deliverers' Union of New York 6 the plaintiffs were denied mem-
bership simply because the union closed its books to new members. There-
in the court said that a closed shop contract and a union with restricted
membership were contrary to public policy and, therefore, "a union may
restrict its membership at pleasure; it may, under certain conditions, law-
fully contract with employers that all work shall be given to its members.
But it cannot do both. ' 7 This view was adopted by the California Supreme
James v. Marinship Corp." where a closed shop agreement existed between
Court in the union and the plaintiffs' employer, but the union did not
admit Negroes. Plaintiffs there contended that an auxiliary, set up by the
union for Negro members, and to which they had to belong in order to
work, was not a bona fide union local and did not offer equal privileges
and benefits of union membership. The court, therefore, extended the
concept set down in Wilson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers Union of
New York9 and held that not only may a union be prevented from main-
2 Ibid., at 494. See also Murphy v. Higgins, 12 N.Y.S. 2d 913 (1939), aff'd 260 App. Div.
854, 23 N.Y.S. 2d 552 (1940); Muller v. Bricklayers Union, 6 N.J. Misc. 226, 140 Atl. 424
(1928).
3 Miller v. Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 394 (1938). 4 Ibid.
5 See also Clark v. Curtis, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 55 (1947), rev'd on other grounds 273 App.
Div. 797, 76 N.Y.S. 2d 3 (1947). This case held that courts have no control over mem-
bership in unions, and a person may be excluded from a union without reason, or for
any reason other than race, color, creed, or national origin. Hence, the common law
rule is modified. The Clark case is predicated upon two New York Statutes. N.Y. Civil
Rights Law (McKinney, 1951) §§ 41, 43; N.Y. Executive Law (McKinney, 1951), as
amended c. 15, §§ 290-301 (1955).
6 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 197 Atl. 720 (1938).
7 Ibid., at 351 and 722. E.g., Seligman v. Toledo Moving Pictures Union, 88 Ohio App.
137, 98 N.E. 2d 54 (1947); Carroll v. Local No. 269,133 N.J. Eq. 144, 31 A. 2d 223 (1943);
Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. 2d 886 (1939).
8 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329 (1944).
9 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 197 Ad. 720 (1938).
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taining both a closed shop agreement or other form of labor monopoly
together with an arbitrarily closed or partially closed membership,10 but
that denying union membership on terms of equality with other members
is the equivalent of denying in whole the privilege of membership."
The courts are in disagreement as to whether a person excluded arbi-
trarily from membership in a union is entitled to relief only if it is shown
that the union has obtained a monopoly in the supply of labor in the
area, or whether proof of a closed shop agreement with the plaintiff's
employer will suffice. Williams v. International Brotherhood of Boiler-
makers12 held that the failure to allege a monopoly of labor is not fatal
and pointed out that although certain cases emphasize the fact that such
a monopoly existed, 18 only in the case of Walter v. McCarvel14 was it
stated that relief must be denied because of the failure to show a monop-
oly. In other jurisdictions, the court continued, relief was granted against
the maintenance of a closed shop and an arbitrarily closed union without
requiring proof of a labor monopoly.15
Plaintiffs' second contention in the instant case is that the failure to
allow them membership violates the Fair Employment Code of Wiscon-
sin.' The Supreme court, by citing Section 111.31 (3) 17 of the statute
reached the conclusion that racial discrimination is not illegal; it is simply
undesirable and the public policy of the state is to encourage and foster
employment without discrimination, not compel it.
10 Authority cited note 8 supra. The court there said that a closed union could co-exist
with a closed shop if the union was not closed arbitrarily, and held that simply rejecting
persons, or expelling those who refused to abide by any reasonable regulation or lawful
policy adopted by the union was not arbitrary. Cf. Dotson v. International Alliance
of Theatrical Employees, 34 Cal. 2d 362, 210 P. 2d 5 (1949).
11 Authority cited note 8 supra.
12 27 Cal. 2d 586, 165 P. 2d 903 (1946).
18 Carroll v. Local No. 269, 133 N.J. Eq. 144, 31 A. 2d 223 (1943); Wilson v. News-
paper and Mail Deliverers of New York, 123 N.J. Eq. 347, 197 At. 720 (1938).
14 309 Mass. 260, 34 N.E. 2d 677 (1941).
15 Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. 2d 886 (1939).
16 Wis. Stat. Ann. (1957) §§ 11.1.31 to 111.36. Section 111.31(1) provides that "the
practice of denying employment and other opportunities to, and discriminating against,
properly qualified persons by reason of their race, creed, color . . is likely to ... ad-
versely affect the general welfare of a state by depriving it of the fullest utilization of
its capacities for production. The denial by some ... labor unions of employment oppor-
tunities to such persons solely because of their race, creed, color ... tends to deprive
the victims of the earnings which are necessary to maintain a just and decent standard
of living, thereby committing grave injury to them."
17 Wis. Stat. Ann. (1957) S 111.31 (3): "In the interpretation and application of this
subchapter.., it is declared to be the public policy of the state to encourage and foster
to the fullest extent practicable the employment of all properly qualified persons re-
gardless of their race, creed, color .... "
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Of the fifteen states enjoying fair employment legislation, i s Wisconsin,
Indiana and Kansas are the only three which allow for the removal of
discriminatory practices on an almost completely voluntary basis.' 9 The
remaining twelve provide substantial legal means for the abolition of dis-
criminatory practices. These twelve states make it an unfair employment
practice for a labor organization to exclude an individual from member-
ship because of his race or color.20 They provide for fair employment
practices commissions, which, after holding hearings and determining that
a respondent has been guilty of an unfair employment practice, issue and
cause to be served on such respondent an order requiring him to cease
and desist from such practice.21 The statutes also provide for the issuance
of court decrees to enforce the orders of the commissions. 22 Penalties for
failure to carry into effect the orders of the commission are provided for
in Washington, New Jersey, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and New York.23
18Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953) § 81 (19), (1); Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) c. 61, § 371; Ind.
Stat. Ann. (Bums, 1955) § 10-2401; Kan. Gen. Star. Ann. (1949) c. 44, § 8, as amended,
(1955) c. 44, § 8; Mass. Ann. L. (1950) c. 151 (B); Mich. Stat. Ann. (1950), as revised,
c. 17, § 154 (Supp., 1955); Minn. L. (1955) c. 516; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939) c. 18, as
amended, (Supp., 1956) § 18 (25), (1); N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) c. 59; N.Y. Executive L.
(McKinney, 1951) c. 15; Ore. Rev. Star. (1953) c. 659; Penn. Stat. Ann. (Purdons, 1952),
as revised, (1955) c. 43, § 951; R.I. Pub. L. (1949) c. 2181; Wash. Rev. Code (1951)
§ 49.60; Wis. Star. Ann. (1957) §§ 111.31-111.36.
19 Kansas and Indiana do not provide a specific list of unlawful practices such as are
found in other states, nor are there provisions for court enforcements since the adminis-
trative bodies under these laws may not issue cease and desist orders. Ind. Star. Ann.
(Bums, 1955) c. 23, § 40-2303; Kan. Gen. Star. Ann. (1949) c. 44, § 8, as amended, c. 44,
9 8 (Supp., 1955); Wis. Stat. Ann. (1957) §§ 111.35, 111.36.
20Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953), as amended, Session Laws of Colo. (1955) § 81(19) (5);
Conn. Gen. Stat. (1949) Title 61, c. 371, § 7405; Mass. Laws Ann. (1950) c. 151 (B), § 4;
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1950) Title 17, c. 154, S 17.458 (3) (Supp., 1955); Minn. L. (1955)
c. 516, § 5; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939) c. 18, § 18:25-12 (Supp., 1956); N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953)
§ 59(4) (4); N.Y. Executive Law (McKinney, 1951) c. 15, § 296; Ore. Rev. Star. (1953)
S 659.030; Penn. Stat. Ann. (Purdons, 1952) c. 43, § 955 (Supp., 1956); R.I. Pub. Laws
(1949) c. 2181, § 4; Wash. Rev. Code (1951) § 49.60.190.
21Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953), as amended, Session Laws of Colo. (1955) § 81(19) (6);
Conn. Gen. Star. (1949) Title 61, c. 371, 7406; Mass. Laws Ann. (1950) c. 151 (B), § 5;
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1950) Title 17, c. 154, § 17.458 (Supp., 1955); Minn. L. (1955) c. 516,
S 9; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939) c. 18, § 18:25-17 (Supp., 1956); N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953)
§ 59(4) (10) ; N.Y. Executive Law (McKinney, 1951) c. 15, § 297; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953)
§ 659.060 (4); Penn. Stat. Ann. (Purdons, 1952) c. 43, § 95 (Supp., 1956); R.I. Pub. Laws
(1949) c. 2181, § 8 (H); Wash. Rev. Code (1951) § 49.60.250.
22Colo. Rev. Star. (1953), as amended, Session Laws of Colo. (1955) § 81(19) (7);
Conn. Gen. Star. (1949) Title 61, c. 371 7407; Mass. Laws Ann. (1950) c. 151 (B), § 6;
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1950) Title 17, c. 154, 9 17.458 (Supp., 1955); Minn. L. (1955) c. 516,
§ 10; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1939) c. 18, § 18:25-19 (Supp., 1956); N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953)
§ 59(4) (11); N.Y. Executive Laws (McKinney, 1951) c. 15, § 298; Ore. Rev. Stat. (1953)
c. 659, § 659.070; Penn. Stat. Ann. (Purdons, 1952) c. 43, § 960 (Supp., 1956); R.I. Pub.
Laws (1949) c. 2181, § 9; Wash. Rev. Code (1951) § 49.60.260.
23 Wash. Rev. Code (1951) § 49.60.310; N.J. Star. Ann. (1939) c. 18, § 18:25-26
(Supp., 1956); Minn. Laws (1955) c. 516, § 11; Pern. Stat. Ann. (Purdons, 1952) c. 43,
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The fair employment acts of some states are strengthened by making it
an unfair labor practice for a union to:
1. elicit information or attempt to elicit any information directly or indi-
rectly pertaining to the race or color of an applicant for membership.2 4
2. make or keep a record of his race or color.25
3. use a membership blank containing questions pertaining to race or
color.
26
4. print a notice relating to membership indicating any preference based
upon race or color.2 1
5. deny or limit through a quota system, membership because of race or
color.28
As to the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting discrimination by labor
unions, the Supreme Court of the United States in Railway Mail Ass'n. v.
Corsi29 held that Section 43 and related Sections 41 and 45 of New York's
Civil Rights Law, which provide, under penalty against its officers and
members, that no labor organization shall deny a person membership for
reasons of race or color, do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States says:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The plaintiffs' third contention, that the discrimination against them was
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, was dismissed by the court.
Citing Shelley v. Kraemer,30 the Wisconsin court, in the instant case, said
that the action prohibited by this section of the Fourteenth Amendment
§ 961 (Supp., 1956); N.Y. Executive Law (McKinney, 1951) c. 15, § 299; Colo. Rev. Star.
(1952) c. 80, § 80(5) (20), contains the Labor Peace Act which provides for a penalty
for failure to allow a member into a union because of race, creed or color.
24 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1950) Title 17, c. 154, § 17.458 (Supp., 1955); Penn. Star. Ann.
(Purdons, 1952) c. 43, § 955 (Supp., 1956); R.I. Pub. Laws (1949) c. 2181, § 4.
25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid.
29 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
a0 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In this case the Court held that the enforcement by a state court
of a covenant between private parties discriminating against Negroes in the occupancy
or ownership of land was state action denying equal protection of the laws. However,
the Court held, "so long as the provisions of these agreements are effectuated by volun-
tary adherence to their terms, it would appear that there has been no action by the
State and the provisions of the Amendment have not been violated." Ibid., at 13.
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is only such action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. The court
said:
The instant complaint does not allege any state action in aid of the discrimina-
tion practiced here. On the contrary, the state deplores it and through the good
offices of its industrial commission has sought to end it.31
The question as to the violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by a union
discriminating as to membership has not yet been decided by the Supreme
Court. Mr. Homer Hewitt in his article The Right to Membership in a
Labor Union3 2 says that "the theory supporting a constitutional right to
membership is that the exclusionary acts of a union operating under pow-
ers given by a state are 'state action' within the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 33
Mr. Hewitt thinks that perhaps the authority that best supports a constitu-
tional right to join a union is the "white primary cases." In Nixon v.
Condon,3 4 an action was brought against Texas election officials who re-
fused to give petitioner a ballot to vote in the Democratic primary. Hav-
ing repealed an old statute which denied Negroes the right to participate
in a Democratic party primary, they enacted a new statute which pro-
vided that the political parties in the state through their State Executive
Committee shall have the power to prescribe the qualifications of its own
members and shall in its own way determine who is qualified to vote. Mr.
Justice Cardozo ruled that the State Executive Committee of the Demo-
cratic party acted under the authority of the state of Texas and that this,
therefore, constituted state action violating the Fourteenth Amendment.
In his opinion, Mr. Justice Cardozo said:
Whatever power of exclusion has been exercised by the members of the com-
mittee, has come to them ... not as the delegates of the party, but as the delegates
of the State.35
In Smith v. A1wright,36 the Court ruled that Negroes cannot be denied
the right to vote in state primaries, since even in the absence of a statute
which gives its sanction to private rules by political organizations, these
parties were subject to the statutory control of the states.37
These white primary cases, according to Mr. Hewitt, show that vol-
untary associations are not immune from constitutional limitations.3 8 The
analogy to unions is clear according to Hewitt. "In negotiating a collec-
tive bargaining contract, and otherwise representing the worker, the
31 Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W. 2d 315, 319, 320 (1957).
32 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 919 (1951).
33 Ibid., at 939. 35 Ibid., at 85.
3 4 286 U.S. 73 (1932). 36321 U.S. 649 (1944).
37 1 Race Relations Law Rept. 613, 635 (1956).
38 Hewitt, The Right to Membership in a Labor Union, 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 919, 941,
942.
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recognized union is exercising legislative and governmental powers. This
power has been derived from the state or federal government, for without
the statute, the union has no right to be exclusive representative." 3 How-
ever, though the Supreme Court may not find "state action" by virtue
of the authority granted the union by the State, there is the possibility
that it would find "state action" by following the line of reasoning given
by the dissenting judge in Ross v. Ebert who said:
It has now been made clear by the Supreme Court of the United States that
a state court must not enforce a private contract to exclude persons from the
ownership or enjoyment of property because of their race .... It seems clearly
to follow that if a union had a constitution which restricted its membership on
the grounds of race, the courts could not enforce that restriction.40
We find, therefore, in the absence of legislation to the contrary, that
courts generally, because of the voluntary nature of labor unions refuse
to interfere in the selection of their members. This has been modified in
most of the jurisdictions that have dealt with the problem by holding that
if a closed shop exists, making it imposible for a person to find employ-
ment, the union may not arbitrarily exclude him from membership.
Fair employment legislation dealing with union discrimination has
played an important part in the last twelve years, and has also succeeded
in modifying the rule laid down in the Mayer case by holding that unions
may not exclude a person from membership because of his race or color.
We can see, therefore, that the common law rule, which declares that
unions may exclude from membership any applicant for any reason, has
been qualified in some jurisdictions in two respects: (1) when a closed
shop exists unions may not discriminate; 41 (2) unions may not discrim-
inate because of the color of a person's skin.
The question of discrimination in regard to union membership as vio-
lating the Fourteenth Amendment is still unanswered. Perhaps, with the
tendency of the Supreme Court to extend the concept of "state action,"
it will one day hold that since the union derives some of its rights from
the state, the discriminatory action by the union will be interpreted as
being the action of the state.42 Or the Court may agree with the dissenting
judge above and hold that the enforcement by a state court of a discrim-
inatory restriction of a union is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
39 Ibid., at 942.
40 This case will not be heard by the Supreme Court as the two plaintiffs have been
admitted into the union.
41 The cases mentioning closed shop were decided prior to the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley Act whereby under this Act the closed shop was outlawed, but the union shop
was allowed. Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, at l§ 7 and 8(a) (3), 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157 and 158(a) (3) (1947).
42 Authority cited note 33 supra.
